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Abstract 
This paper forms part of the proceedings of the 10th Annual Berle Symposium (2018), which 
focused on Adolf Berle and the world he influenced.  He and Gardiner Means documented in 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) what they said was a separation of 
ownership and control in major American business enterprises.  Berle and Means became 
sufficiently closely associated with the separation of ownership and control pattern for the 
large American public firm to be christened subsequently “the Berle-Means corporation”.  
This paper focuses on the “rise” of the Berle-Means corporation, considering in so doing why 
ownership became divorced from control in most of America’s biggest companies.  It also 
assesses whether developments concerning institutional investors and shareholder activism 
have precipitated the “fall” of the Berle-Means corporation, meaning U.S. corporate 
governance is no longer characterized by a separation of ownership and control.       
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means maintained in 1932 in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property that “in the largest American corporations, a new condition has 
developed….(T)here are no dominant owners, and control is maintained in large measure 
apart from ownership.”1  This claim that in large firms ownership had separated from control 
would have an enduring legacy.  Economists James Hawley and Andrew Williams suggested 
in 2000 “(t)he phenomenon Berle and Means identified in 1932 – the divorce of ownership 
and control – would come to dominate most thinking about issues of corporate governance 
for the rest of the twentieth century.”2  Indeed, in 1991, law professor Mark Roe coined the 
term “Berle-Means corporation” to refer to a large public firm with fragmented share 
ownership.3  This shorthand (sometimes changed slightly to “Berle and Means corporation”) 
has been adopted with some regularity since.4 
This paper examines the rise and the possible fall of the Berle-Means corporation.  
With respect to the rise, it might be thought nearly nine decades after the publication of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property it would be well known why the separation of 
ownership and control which Berle and Means documented was occurring.  Plausible causes 
                                                          
1  ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 110-11 (1932).    
2  JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM:  
HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 42 
(2000).    
3  Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
10, 11 (1991).   
4  See, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 671, 674 (1995); Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate 
Law between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 697, 698 (2005); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Organic Corporate 
Governance, 59 B.C. L. REV. 21, 29 (2018).   See also infra notes 143-44 and related 
discussion.  
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have indeed been identified but debate continues.5  This paper will not provide a definitive 
explanation for the separation of ownership and control in large American firms.  Doing so 
may be impossible since multiple factors contributed to the rise of the Berle-Means 
corporation.   
With respect to the rise of the Berle-Means corporation the paper moves the debate 
about causes forward in two ways.  First, an analytical framework will be provided that 
clarifies the factors at work.  Second, an important voice will be added to the discussion, 
namely Adolf Berle’s.  He speculated on various occasions on developments that likely 
contributed to the separation of ownership and control he and co-author Gardiner Means 
sought to document.  His conjectures provide intriguing insights into why the Berle-Means 
corporation moved to the forefront of American corporate governance.   
Given that Mark Roe conceived of the expression “Berle-Means corporation” in the 
early 1990s and given that the shorthand caught on thereafter it might be assumed that a 
separation of ownership and control remains well-ensconced in the American corporate 
governance firmament.  In fact, doubts have been cast recently on the continued relevance of 
Berle and Means’ description of the typical large public company.  For instance, in 2013 
corporate law scholars Ronald Gilson and Jeff Gordon argued “(t)he Berle-Means premise of 
dispersed share ownership is now wrong.”6  Thus, the Berle-Means corporation could be 
falling away as a symbol of American corporate governance arrangements, if it has not fallen 
already.   
                                                          
5  Cools, supra note 4, 698.  See also Part IV infra.  
6  Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:  
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865 
(2013).    
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This paper argues that it is premature to write off the Berle-Means corporation.  The 
Berle-Means analysis of the public company, duly amended to reflect the growing 
prominence of institutional shareholders, remains relevant.7  When Berle and Means wrote, 
aside from those stockholders that were vested with sufficient voting power to count on 
prevailing when resolutions were put forward, the shareholder base of public companies was 
comprised largely of individuals with tiny stakes who had neither the aptitude nor the 
inclination to intervene in corporate affairs.  Today, with institutional investors holding the 
bulk of public company shares, this sort of wholesale diffusion of share ownership and an 
associated intrinsic bias in favor of passivity are now absent.  The collective ownership stakes 
of leading institutional shareholders are now substantial enough to mean theoretically they 
can readily collaborate and put executives running large companies squarely on the back foot, 
a prospect foreign to the dispersed individual shareholders prevalent when Berle and Means 
wrote.   
While the rise of institutional investors has changed governance dynamics in large 
American public companies, passivity remains the default position for today’s shareholders.  
This pattern, moreover, is being reinforced by the rapidly growing popularity of funds the 
mandate of which is to buy and sell shares to match the performance of well-known stock 
market indices.  The business model of these “index trackers”, oriented around simplicity and 
cost-savings, creates a strong bias in favor of governance passivity likely to reinforce the sort 
of managerial autonomy with which Berle and Means would have been familiar.  The term 
“Berle-Means corporation” thus remains appropriate short-hand for the paradigmatic 
American public company.   
                                                          
7  For a similar argument, made primarily in the British context but also referring to the 
American situation, see MARC MOORE & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  LAW, 
REGULATION AND THEORY 98-99 (2017).  
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The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II charts the rise of the Berle-Means 
corporation, indicating in so doing that the separation of ownership and control with which 
Berle and Means became associated remained very much a work in progress when The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property was published in 1932.  Section III discusses the 
explanation for ownership separating from control that was widely, if often implicitly, 
accepted through to the early 1990s, namely that a strong managerial orientation and diffuse 
share ownership inexorably followed from basic business logic.  Section IV considers in an 
American context theoretical explanations for ownership and control patterns advanced since 
that point in time, organizing the analysis by reference to three core questions:  1) Why might 
those owning large blocks of shares want to exit or accept dilution of their stake? 2) Will 
there be demand for shares available for sale? 3) Will the new investors be inclined to 
exercise control themselves?   
Section V switches the focus of the paper from the past to the present, drawing 
attention to arguments that institutional investors have collectively accumulated a sufficiently 
sizeable collective stake to displace the Berle-Means corporation.  Section VI reverts to a 
historical approach, discussing past patterns of behavior of institutional shareholders to show 
that a public company can be characterized by a separation of ownership and control even if 
institutional investors own the bulk of the shares.  Section VII draws upon the insights 
Section VI provides to argue that the Berle-Means corporation shorthand remains relevant 
today and likely will remain so for the foreseeable future.  Section VIII concludes.   
II. THE RISE OF THE BERLE-MEANS CORPORATION 
A description of a separation of ownership and control in America’s largest 
companies was the best-known feature of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ renowned 1932 
book The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  Fully diffuse share ownership did not 
prevail, however, in a majority of large public firms at that point in time.  The rise of the 
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Berle-Means corporation, marked by a dearth of dominant shareholders and by executives 
owning no more than a small fraction of the equity, would only be consolidated after World 
War II.  
A. Ownership and Control as of 1930 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property has long been recognized as a book of 
pivotal importance.  Historian Robert Hessen wrote in 1983 as part of a symposium marking 
the 50th anniversary of publication “(f)ew American books have been as highly 
acclaimed…and fewer still enjoy as illustrious a reputation fifty years after they were 
published.”8  Esteemed management theorist Peter Drucker suggested in 1991 Berle and 
Means’ monograph was “arguably the most influential book in U.S. business history.”9  
Sociologist Mark Mizruchi maintained in 2004 “the field now known as corporate 
governance dates back to Berle and Means’s classic work.”10 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property addressed several themes, including 
documenting a growing concentration of economic power in large corporations and exploring 
the role judicially generated equitable constraints could and should play in limiting the 
exercise of managerial power.11  However, the primary theme, occupying two-thirds of the 
book, was the separation of ownership and control in large business enterprises.12  The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property would in turn become best known subsequently 
                                                          
8  Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property:  A Reappraisal, 26 J. 
L. & ECON. 273, 273 (1983). 
9  Peter F. Drucker, Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., 
March/April 1991, 106, 114.    
10  Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and Power of Large 
U.S. Corporations, 33 THEORY & SOCIETY 579, 579 (2004).   
11  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, 18-46, 196-206, 219-43; George J. Stigler and Claire 
Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 
238-40 (1983).   
12  Thomas K. McCraw, Berle and Means, 18 REV. AM. HIST. 578, 584 (1990).     
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for this feature.13  George Dent, a corporate law academic, said in 1989 that since the book 
had been published, “corporate law’s central dilemma has been the separation of ownership 
and control in public corporations.”14  Fellow corporate law professor William Bratton wrote 
in 2001 that the “The Modern Corporation and Private Property still speaks in an active 
voice.  Since it first appeared in 1932, corporate law has been reckoning with its description 
of a problem of management responsibility stemming from a separation of ownership and 
control.”15  Historians Kenneth Lipartito and Yumiko Morii maintained in a Berle 
symposium article published in 2010 the book “has attracted historians, economists, policy 
makers, and the popular press, all of whom accepted its thesis on the separation of ownership 
and management in the modern corporation.”16 
One might infer from the notoriety of Berle and Means’ separation of ownership and 
control thesis that dominant shareholders were passé in large U.S. companies by 1932.  Berle 
and Means indeed referred in The Modern Corporation and Private Property to “a 
revolution” that “has destroyed the unity that we commonly call property – has divided 
ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it” and declared that “the 
dispersion of ownership has gone to tremendous lengths among the largest companies and 
has progressed to a considerable extent among the medium sized.”17  In fact, the diffusion of 
share ownership with which the book is so closely associated still had some distance to go.   
                                                          
13  Mizruchi, supra note 10, 581; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins:  Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 99, 148 (2008).   
14  George W. Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 
[1989] WISC. L. REV. 881, 881.   
15  William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 737, 737 (2001) (footnote omitted).  
16  Kenneth Lipartito & Yumiko Morii, Rethinking the Separation of Ownership from 
Management in American History, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2010). 
17  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, 7, 53.   
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Berle and Means relied on empirical analysis to document their claim that a 
separation of ownership and control characterized large U.S. companies.  Drawing on 
industrial manuals, press reports and “street knowledge” they reported on control 
arrangements in the 42 railroads, 52 public utilities and 106 industrials which comprised 
America’s largest 200 non-financial corporations, ranked by assets.18  Berle and Means 
categorized companies as being under 1) “private ownership” (an individual or compact 
group owning most or all of the shares) 2) “majority control” (ownership of a majority of 
stock by a single individual or small group) 3) “control through legal device” (use of 
corporate “pyramids”, non-voting shares and voting trusts to secure the legal power to vote a 
majority of the voting shares) 4) “minority control” (an individual or small group holding a 
sufficiently large minority stake to dominate the affairs of the company) 5) “management 
control” (no individual or small group having a minority interest large enough – defined as 20 
percent -- to hold sway) 6) in receivership.   
Berle and Means’ data did not match up fully with their “revolution” rhetoric.  Only a 
minority (88) of their 200 companies qualified as management controlled and only 21 of 
these 88 were categorized as management-controlled on the basis of direct evidence of a lack 
of a shareholder with an ownership stake of 20 percent or more.19  The other “management 
controlled” companies were ones where the locus of control was doubtful but was presumed 
to be held by management and where there was a dominant shareholder but that shareholder 
was a corporation that fell into the management control category.20   
                                                          
18  Id. at 19-27, 67-109.  Their analysis expanded on findings Means published in a 1931 
article:  Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry, 
46 Q.J. ECON. 68 (1931).  
19  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, 98-101, 106.  Berle and Means actually classified 88½ 
companies as being under management control.  The half was awarded due to a “special 
situation”, namely the utility Chicago Rys. Co. being in receivership (at 101).   
20  Id. at 90-97. 
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While Berle and Means spoke of a “new condition” in large business enterprises they 
did acknowledge that a divorce between ownership and control was not yet a fully established 
fact.21  They said of the dispersion of the ownership of shares that while “(a) rapidly 
increasing proportion of wealth appears to be taking this form,” “the separation of ownership 
and control has not yet become complete.”22  A 1940 study by the Temporary National 
Economic Committee (TNEC), which had been established jointly by Congress and President 
Franklin Roosevelt to investigate the concentration of economic power in the U.S., 
underscored that dominant shareholders remained prominent in large companies during the 
1930s.23  The TNEC sought to identify as of 1939 who controlled America’s 200 largest non-
financial corporations.  Statutory powers authorizing data gathering were relied upon to 
ascertain the percentage of shares owned by the 20 largest stockholders in each firm and the 
TNEC’s efforts were praised for both accuracy and reliability.24   
The TNEC report distinguished between those companies under ownership control, 
either by a family or another corporation, and those with no center of ownership control, the 
category akin to Berle and Means’ management-controlled grouping.  The TNEC assumed 
ownership control existed where there was a sizeable concentration of equity in the hands of 
an identifiable dominant group or the largest shareholders had managerial representation and 
remaining shareholdings were highly dispersed.  Among the top 200 non-financial 
                                                          
21   Michael Patrick Allen, Management Control in the Large Corporation:  Comment on 
Zeitlin, 81 AM. J. SOC. 885, 885 (1976).   
22  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, 64, 302.   
23  RAYMOND GOLDSMITH et al., THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST 
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, TNEC INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC 
POWER, MONOGRAPH NO. 29 (1940).   
24  Don Villarejo, Stock Ownership and the Control of Corporations, NEW UNIV. 
THOUGHT, Autumn 1961, 33, 50-51, 56; PHILIP H. BURCH, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 
REASSESSED:  FAMILY CONTROL IN AMERICA’S LARGE CORPORATIONS 128 (1972); Dennis 
Leech, Ownership Concentration and Control in Large U.S. Corporations in the 1930s:  An 
Analysis of the TNEC Sample, 35 J. INDUST. ECON. 333, 333 (1987). 
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corporations, the TNEC found that only in 61 was there no center of control.  Of the 
remaining 139 companies, the TNEC classified 77 as being under family control, 56 as being 
controlled by other corporations and six as being under joint control of family and corporate 
interest groups.  The TNEC concluded control through ownership (albeit usually minority 
control) was the typical situation in large business enterprises.25   
B. Consolidation of the Separation of Ownership and Control 
While Berle and Means’ 1932 declaration that ownership and control were apart “in 
large measure” likely was an overstatement at that point in time matters were evolving in the 
direction they had suggested.  The New York Times said in 1943 that “wealthy individuals 
(and) estates are disposing of important stockholdings piecemeal….(T)his liquidation is being 
absorbed by an army of relatively small investors….The current period will go down in 
financial history as one in which important changes were made in the ownership of 
corporations.”26  The same newspaper said in 1955 of public companies and their executives: 
“A generation or so ago, most corporations were held by small groups of investors.  
Often as not, members of the founding family held the majority of shares.  Then came 
in succession the Great Depression, high taxes on incomes and estates and the need 
for new capital in a rapidly growing economy.  Result:  today, the stock of many 
companies is widely distributed among thousands or even hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders. 
 Management, in effect, has become a high-priced employe(e).”27  
                                                          
25  ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 42 (1945).  
26  Edward J. Condlon, Scattering of Big Security Blocks Speeded by Taxes, Post-War 
Views, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1943, S7. 
27  Richard Rutter, Proxy Wards Shed No Gore, Much Ink, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1955, 
44.   
10 
 
 
 
A 1955 study of the background of chief executives and board chairmen of large companies 
covering 1900, 1925 and 1950 confirmed “the general trend is toward increasing 
management control” unaffiliated with substantial share ownership, evidenced by the fact that 
as of 1950 at least three-quarters of the chief executives and chairmen owned less than one 
percent of their company’s voting stock.28   
Berle would in time agree that the emergent historical process he and Means had 
identified was subsequently consolidated in a way that made a separation of ownership and 
control the norm in large public companies.  In 1959 he said “(a) ‘big corporation’ of the year 
1925 was still primarily a personal expression.  In 1955, the same corporation…is quite 
obviously an institution.”29  He noted the same year that while as of 1929 large enterprises 
were usually under the “working control” of shareholders, “management 
control…meaning…that no large concentrated stockholding exists that maintains a close 
working relationship with management”  had become “the norm” with “the bulk of American 
industry now.”30  In a 1962 New York Times article Berle said of public company shares 
“distribution continues to split up big holdings.  Most big corporations are not – indeed 
cannot be – controlled by any shareholder.”31  He observed similarly in the Columbia Law 
Review the same year “(n)o one…now denies the essential separation of ownership of the 
large corporation from its control.  Thirty years have markedly accentuated this separation.”32 
                                                          
28  MABEL NEWCOMER, THE BIG BUSINESS EXECUTIVE:  THE FACTORS THAT MADE HIM 
5-6 (1955). 
29  Adolf A. Berle, Foreword, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY ix, xiv (Edward S. 
Mason ed., 1959). 
30  ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY:  A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 73-74 (1959).   
31  A.A. Berle, Bigness: Curse or Opportunity?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1962, Sunday 
Magazine, 10.   
32  Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 
437 (1962). 
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Berle’s assessment reflected the general consensus.  Forbes indicated in 1957 
“today’s manager works for no single imperious owner.  Instead he serves thousands, even 
hundreds of thousands of stockholder owners.”33  Harvard economist Edward Mason 
observed in 1959 “(a)lmost everyone now agrees that in the large corporation, the owner is, 
in general a passive recipient; that typically control is in the hands of management; and that 
management normally selects its own replacements.”34  Princeton sociologist Wilbert Moore 
wrote in 1962 that “the Berle-Means doctrine” had “achieved wide acceptance” and that 
managers had “acquired a large degree of independence from stockholders.”35   
While by the beginning of the 1960s it was widely accepted that in large public 
companies diffuse share ownership was the norm and dominant shareholders were 
anomalous, empirical data on point was “all too often scanty or badly out of date.”36  The 
TNEC’s 1939 study remained the best source.37  Matters changed in the 1960s and 1970s, 
with a number of studies of ownership and control being conducted.  Economist Robert 
Larner, for instance, sought to replicate Berle and Means’ methodology using data from 
1963.  He reported that 75 percent of the 500 largest companies in the U.S. were under 
management control and said his results showed the “managerial revolution” was “close to 
                                                          
33  Not to Pioneer, But to Mesh…, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1957, 27. 
34  Edward S. Mason, Introduction in THE CORPORATION, supra note 29, 1, 4 (Edward S. 
Mason ed., 1959).    
35  WILBERT E. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION 6-7 (1962).  
36  Villarejo, supra note 24, 49. 
37  Id. at 51.  See also ROBERT J. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE 
CORPORATION 7 (1970). 
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complete.”38  Business Week agreed, saying Larner’s data established that 
“(m)anagement…holds sway in all but a minor share of America's corporate giants.”39  
Additional research confirmed for the most part Larner’s finding that dispersed 
ownership was the norm in large American business enterprises in the 1960s and 1970s.40  
There were studies indicating that only a minority of large companies had fully diffuse share 
ownership but most of these used a low threshold of share ownership of 5 percent or more to 
find “control”.41  Noted political theorist Robert Dahl said in 1970 that “(e)very literate 
person now rightly takes for granted what Berle and Means established four decades ago in 
their famous study.”42  There was by that point in time a solid empirical foundation for the 
received wisdom.   
III. THE BERLE-MEANS CORPORATION AS A PRODUCT OF BUSINESS LOGIC 
Having documented the rise of the Berle-Means corporation in the United States, we 
will consider now why a separation of ownership and control became the norm in large 
public companies.  Accounting for patterns of ownership and control in the corporate context 
is not a straightforward exercise, with multiple factors plausibly contributing to prevailing 
arrangements.  Economists Randall Morck and Lloyd Steier have said of theories advanced to 
explain cross-country variations, “(i)t would be wonderful for economists if we could 
                                                          
38  LARNER, supra note 37, 17; Robert J. Larner, Ownership and Control in the 200 
Largest Nonfinancial Corporations, 1929 and 1963, 56 AMER. ECON. REV. 777, 787 (1966). 
39  Managers Tighten Their Grip, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 1966, 63   
40  For a summary, see Brian Cheffins & Steve Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a 
Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443, 468-69 (2009) (see Appendix 2).    
41  Id. at 458, 470-71 (Appendix 3).   
42  ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION 104 (1970).   
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conclude that one is correct and discard the others, but economics is rarely so simple.”43  The 
United States is no different in this regard.  Finance professor Marco Becht and economic 
historian Bradford DeLong conceded in a 2005 paper seeking to account for the dearth of 
controlling shareholders in U.S. public companies “the story we have to tell turns out not to 
be a neat one.”44   
While providing a definitive explanation why a divorce of ownership and control took 
place in the U.S. probably is not feasible, plausible conjectures regarding contributing factors 
can be offered.  A helpful way to start is to consider the extent to which basic business logic 
accounts for what occurred.  Until the early 1990s, it was universally, if largely implicitly, 
accepted that no further explanation was required for the separation of ownership and control 
in large firms.  Doubts would arise at that point that would provide a platform for the 
development of theories regarding ownership and control canvassed in Part IV.   
A. The Business Logic Underlying the Separation of Ownership and Control 
While it is now widely acknowledged that explaining ownership patterns in large 
corporations is not a straightforward exercise, doubts about why the Berle-Means corporation 
moved to the forefront of America’s corporate economy were slow to emerge.  Once a 
consensus developed that there in fact was a separation of ownership and control in large 
American corporations, to the extent that there was debate about the phenomenon it focused 
on whether the stockholder passivity associated with diffuse share ownership begat 
counterproductively unconstrained executive power that necessitated a substantial regulatory 
                                                          
43  Randall K. Morck & Lloyd Steier, The Global History of Corporate Governance:  An 
Introduction, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD:  FAMILY 
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 1, 29 (Randall K. Morck, ed., 2005).      
44  Marco Becht & Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been so Little Blockholding in 
America?, in HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 43, 613, 651.  
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response.45  Underpinning the discourse was a widespread belief that, as a matter of business 
logic, most large corporations would feature diffuse share ownership and managerial control.   
The consensus regarding the business logic explanation for the divorce of ownership 
and control in large firms was typically implicit.46  For instance, a review of a 1968 reissue of 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property noted when describing the managerially 
controlled firms dominating the American economy that even “(m)odern critics of the large 
corporation usually take for granted its inevitability.”47  Law professor Nicholas Wolfson, 
very much a fan rather than a critic of big business, nevertheless made explicit the reasoning 
involved in 1984, saying “(t)he separation of ownership and control is the inevitable product 
of the need to maximize managerial efficiency in corporate firms.”48  Such reasoning 
harkened back to The Modern Corporation and Private Property, where Berle and Means 
said “(d)ispersion in the ownership of separate enterprises appears to be inherent in the 
corporate system.  It has already proceeded far, it is rapidly increasing, and appears to be an 
inevitable development.”49 
Financial imperatives were part of the logic assumed to underpin the managerially-
dominated corporation’s move to the forefront.  Companies needing to raise large amounts of 
capital seemingly could proceed most readily if their equity was carved up into small units 
                                                          
45  Gregory A. Mark, Realms of Choice:  Finance Capitalism and Corporate 
Governance, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 973, 975-76 (1995); Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory 
of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456, 480-83 (2004).   
46  PAUL A. BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL:  AN ESSAY ON THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER 21 (1966) (indicating that it was “taken for 
granted as an accomplished fact” that control of large corporations would end up in 
management’s hands).   
47  Robert Lekachman, The Corporation Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1968, Book Review, 
8.   
48  NICHOLAS WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION:  FREE MARKETS VERSUS 
REGULATION 39 (1984).   
49  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, 47.   
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that could be distributed publicly to thousands of investors.50  Dispersed share ownership 
would then typically follow in turn.  This logic seemingly appealed to Berle and Means, who 
said “(i)n a truly large corporation, the investment necessary for majority ownership is so 
considerable as to make control extremely expensive.”51  Berle struck a similar chord in 
1954, indicating a separation of ownership and control “was inevitable, granting that modern 
organizations of production and distribution must be so large as to be incapable of being 
owned by any individual or small group of individuals.”52  
Practical challenges associated with running large business enterprises also featured in 
the basic business logic assumed to underpin the divorce between ownership and control.  As 
firms grew bigger, their operations were likely to become more complex and physically de-
centralized.  Continued success under such circumstances, the thinking went, was contingent 
upon developing robust managerial capabilities buttressed by the hiring of career-oriented, 
professionally trained executives.53  Moreover, so long as companies refrained from treating 
substantial stock ownership as a necessary qualification for a top executive post, the talent 
pool from which senior management could be drawn would be greatly expanded.  A split 
between ownership and control logically ensued.  For instance, business historian Thomas 
Cochran accounted in 1957 for the two being divorced in large firms on the basis “that large-
scale mass production and transportation hastened the shift toward managerial…control” with 
“the new big companies plac(ing) executive control in the hands of careerists, selected for 
                                                          
50  MARGARET BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:  RETHINKING CORPORATE 
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their managerial ability.  The professional executive needed to own no stock in the enterprise, 
and if he did buy some it was usually not enough to give him any great stake in the company 
profits.”54   
Alfred Chandler, a distinguished business historian best known for his work on how 
and why firms which pioneered the implementation of sophisticated managerial hierarchies in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries achieved commercial pre-eminence,55 was probably the 
leading exponent of the close association between the bolstering of managerial capabilities 
and the growth and success of business enterprises.  His “account of the managerial 
revolution, including the careful and methodical reasoning and mountainous store of evidence 
that seemed to support it, proved so compelling that few historians of business and 
technology took issue with it.”56  According to Chandler, a new transportation and 
communication infrastructure oriented around railways, telegraph networks and subsequently 
telephone service that was taking shape as the 19th century drew to a close meant for the first 
time successful firms were focusing on genuinely national markets for goods and services.57  
At the same time, technological innovations such as mass generation of electric power were 
fostering previously unimaginable economies of scale and thereby encouraging the 
                                                          
54  THOMAS C. COCHRAN, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS SYSTEM:  A HISTORICAL 
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55  ALFRED D. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE:  CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND:  THE 
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(accessed March 12, 2018); Douglas Martin, Alfred D. Chandler Jr., a Business Historian, 
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centralization of production in large plants.58  These changes set the scene for the emergence 
of what Chandler called “the modern business enterprise,” with well-developed managerial 
hierarchies being the defining characteristic.59  Companies that invested heavily in building 
managerial capabilities, Chandler argued, tended to prosper – and dominate -- because they 
would be co-ordinating production, distribution and marketing more effectively than would 
be possible with heavy reliance on arm’s-length transactions between independent 
businesses.60  Hence, corporate success was associated with the growth of what Chandler 
termed in the late 1970s “the visible hand” of management at the expense of the “invisible 
hand” market forces constituted.61    
Chandler maintained that the managerially-focused “visible hand” contributed to 
industrial and commercial success because large plants set up to exploit economies of scale 
had to feature effective capacity utilization, which in turn demanded “the constant attention 
of a managerial team or hierarchy.”62  The national scale on which leading corporations had 
begun to operate also favored investment in managerial capabilities.  Expansion into new 
regions combined with the rolling out of wider ranges of products created risks that those 
overseeing increasingly sprawling enterprises would be overwhelmed by the volume and 
complexity of assigned tasks and that policy and planning would be handled inefficiently by 
negotiations between far-flung corporate fiefdoms.63  The most effective response seemed to 
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CAPITALISM:  A CASEBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 405 
(1985).  See also CHANDLER, VISIBLE, supra note 55, 7. 
63  Oliver Williamson, The Modern Corporation:  Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1537, 1555-56 (1981).   
18 
 
 
 
be a robust managerial hierarchy where divisional managers were assigned responsibility for 
running key business units day-to-day and senior head office executives dictated the general 
direction of the company supported by sophisticated financial control systems and cost 
management techniques.64    
Berle became aware of and acknowledged the connection between Chandler’s 
research and his own work on the separation of ownership and control.  In a 1967 book 
entitled Power he cited research by Chandler from the early 1960s when describing how 
“corporation bureaucracy” emerged in the opening decades of the 20th century because 
“enterprises became too big for personal dictatorship.”65  Chandler in turn cited in his 1977 
book The Visible Hand Larner’s 1960s empirical research on ownership and control when 
saying “by the 1950s the managerial firm had become the standard form of modern business 
enterprise in major sectors of the American economy,” meaning “managerial capitalism had 
gained ascendancy over family and financial capitalism.”66   
Chandler only occasionally referred to Berle and Means in his work on the emergence 
of managerial capitalism.67  Nevertheless, he did acknowledge that Berle and Means launched 
debate about the implications of a separation of ownership from management.68  More 
generally Chandler’s research on the business logic underpinning the growth of managerial 
hierarchies dovetailed neatly with their characterization of the modern corporation as one 
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where executives owning only a small proportion of the shares were in charge.69  Economist 
Richard Langlois said in 2013 “(w)e learned early on from Berle and Means (1932) that, by 
the early twentieth century, the owner-managed firm had given way in the United States to a 
corporate form in which ownership was diffuse and inactive and in which control had 
effectively passed to managers.  Then we learned from Chandler (1977) that this managerial 
revolution was both inevitable and desirable.”70   
Ultimately, facets of Chandler’s research became combined with Berle and Means’ 
separation of ownership and control thesis to generate “a dominant theoretical narrative” that 
in the late 20th century underpinned “our understanding of the evolution of corporate structure 
in the modern era.”71   Mark Roe described in 1994 a “dominant paradigm explaining the 
emergence and success of the large corporation in the United States” that saw “economies of 
scale and technology as producing a fragmentation of shareholding and a shift in power from 
shareholders to senior managers with specialized skills.”72  The Economist said similarly  
“For many years, it has been argued that the present shape of the American 
corporation, in which a vast and dispersed group of shareholders exercises little or no 
control over the firm’s managers, is in some way preordained.  Organising firms like 
this, runs the argument, is simply the most efficient way of adapting to the demands 
of modern capitalism.”73 
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The received wisdom, in sum, was that basic business logic dictated that professional 
executives owning only a small percentage of widely held shares would control the typical 
modern large corporation.   
B. Doubts Arise 
Inconveniently for those in the post-World War II era who believed business logic 
preordained that a successful large company would be widely held and run by career-oriented 
executives lacking a substantial equity stake, from a global perspective the norm for major 
business enterprises was (and is) to have dominant shareholders.74  The standard global 
pattern, however, appeared to be beside the point.  Managerially-oriented American 
companies were the powerhouses of the global corporate economy during the middle decades 
of the 20th century, with 44 of the largest 50 global companies being from the United States 
as of 1959.75  Time said in 1960 “the U.S. corporation has, by and large, used its awesome 
efficiency well (and) has become a model for the world.”76  Economist and journalist 
Leonard Silk drew attention in 1969 to “Europe’s recognition of and concern over the 
remarkable drive of American business management.”77  Given corporate America’s success, 
countries with corporate economies with different institutional characteristics could be safely 
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ignored.  Mark Roe and fellow law professor Ronald Gilson elaborated on why in a 1993 law 
review article:  
“The ‘traditional’ model of American corporate governance presented the Berle-
Means corporation -- characterized by a separation of ownership and management 
resulting from the need of growing enterprises for capital and the specialization of 
management -- as the pinnacle in the evolution of organizational forms.  Given this 
model's dominance, the study of comparative corporate governance was peripheral; 
governance systems differing from the American paradigm were dismissed as mere 
intermediate steps on the path to perfection, or as evolutionary dead-ends, the 
neanderthals of corporate governance.  Neither laggards nor dead-ends made 
compelling objects of study.”78   
While the success American companies were enjoying meant it was understandable 
following World War II there was an undisturbed consensus that business logic preordained a 
separation of ownership and control in large firms, the underlying economic context had 
changed substantially by the time the 1990s got underway.  It was widely believed American 
corporations were losing ground to German and Japanese rivals.79  Share ownership in large 
companies in these countries was considerably more concentrated than was the case in the 
U.S.80  This confluence of circumstances implied, contrary to the business logic presumed to 
underpin the Berle-Means corporation’s American dominance, that an ownership and control 
framework different from that prevailing in the United States was fully capable of delivering 
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similar or even superior results.81  The possibility that successful large firms could be 
organized in various ways raised, in turn, a question decades of American corporate success 
had obscured:  why was the American system of corporate governance oriented around 
diffuse share ownership exemplified by a dearth of dominant shareholders?82  We consider 
leading explanations next. 
IV. OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RISE OF THE BERLE-MEANS CORPORATION 
With the unravelling in the 1990s of the implicit consensus that ownership separated 
from control due to business logic, various theories would be advanced to explain ownership 
patterns in large firms.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer any sort of definitive 
account of why, unlike in most other countries, the Berle-Means corporation came to 
dominate in the U.S. and remained pre-eminent.83  Relevant factors can be identified 
effectively, however, by focusing on three core questions one needs to address to explain why 
ownership will become divorced from control in corporations.84  These are:  1) Why might 
those owning large blocks of shares want to exit or accept dilution of their stake? 2) Will 
there be demand for shares available for sale? 3) Will the new investors be inclined to 
exercise control themselves?   
Once we have canvassed the core questions in a general way we will use them as our 
reference point while considering now well-known theories about ownership and control 
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arrangements that potentially explain why the Berle-Means corporation moved to the 
forefront in the United States.  In so doing, we will take into account observations of Adolf 
Berle’s that shed light on the leading theory on point, namely that the nature of corporate and 
securities law is pivotal.  We will also consider two variables not otherwise addressed that 
likely contributed to the separation of ownership and control in American public companies.    
A. Core Questions 
With the three core questions that provide insights as to why ownership will tend to 
separate from control in large business enterprises, the answer to each is by no means 
obvious.  With question #1, substantial blockholders, due to the influence over corporate 
affairs associated with their voting power, can benefit from their status in ways unavailable to 
other shareholders by securing “private benefits of control”.85  Given the advantages 
associated with being a blockholder, why stand down?86  As a 1926 article in the Los Angeles 
Times indicated, “(n)aturally, the owners of an established business are not anxious to bargain 
for capital on terms that involves the possible loss of control….”87   
The basic business logic that up to the 1990s was assumed to underpin the separation 
of ownership and control in large American firms implied blockholders would be compelled 
to exit because their firms would lose out in the marketplace to better-run managerially 
dominated firms.  The success German and Japanese companies were enjoying at that point 
in time undermined this reasoning.  The fact that successful corporations from such 
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jurisdictions frequently had dominant shareholders implied that the presence of such “core” 
investors in no way precluded faring well against rivals.88   
Ironically, given that Chandler was the pre-eminent advocate of the contribution 
managerial hierarchy made to business success, he ultimately acknowledged the unwinding 
of founder or family holdings was not essential for a corporation to benefit from a 
sophisticated managerial infrastructure.89  Instead, so long as suitably effective executives 
were vested with responsibility for running the business the benefits of managerial 
hierarchies could be available even if a founder and/or his successors retained a dominant 
equity stake.90  Under such circumstances, the core investors would be ongoing beneficiaries 
of managerial control rather than its victims.   
If basic business logic does not compel blockholder exit then why would they opt out?  
Berle addressed the point, albeit rather briskly, in a 1952 New York Times article, saying 
“(f)ifty years ago American corporations did have identifiable owners.  They died, split up 
their holdings, paid inheritance taxes, sold out, gave away their fortunes and otherwise 
dispersed.”91  Given the lure of private benefits of control, it seems unlikely that, death aside, 
dominant shareholders would have capitulated quite as readily as Berle implied.  Why in fact 
did they “split up their holdings” or sell out completely?  Sometimes dominant shareholders 
will exit because there is a window of opportunity where their firm’s shares are 
advantageously priced.92  Other times a blockholder will sell shares because of a need for 
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cash to pursue personal goals.  For instance, to finance an expensive space rocket project Jeff 
Bezos, founder of e-tailing powerhouse Amazon, sold $2 billion’ worth of stock in 2017, 
reducing his stake in the company to 16 percent.93   
The 1955 quote above from the New York Times that referred to taxes and the 
Depression in the 1930s when discussing the unwinding of control in public companies offers 
clues likely more relevant to that era as to why dominant shareholders might exit.94  
Sustained erosion of profits and income can leave the dominant shareholder of a business 
exposed and welcoming the opportunity to sell out despite the theoretical potential for 
extracting private benefits of control.95  The combination of tough times during the 1930s and 
the economic uncertainties and high taxes associated with World War II – from 1942 to 1947 
employment and investment income above $200,000 was taxed at a rate of at least 86.5 
percent96 -- likely meant numerous blockholders were in precisely this position.97  The fact 
that capital gains arising from the sale of shares were taxed at a much lower rate than income, 
with the rate further reduced for assets held for a substantial period of time, provided a 
further tax-related incentive for blockholders to exit.98 
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As for core question #2, even if blockholders are prepared (or even eager) to exit it is 
not self-evident why there will be sufficient demand for shares to permit the unwinding of 
dominant stakes.  If those with capital available to invest buy shares in a company which 
continues to have a dominant shareholder, they can fall victim to extraction of private 
benefits of control.  The circumstances may be no better in a company characterized by a 
separation of ownership and control because executives owning only a small percentage of 
the shares will have incentives to put their own interests first and thereby impose what are 
often characterized as “agency costs” on investors.99   
Matters are also somewhat complicated with question #3.  Assume there is sufficient 
demand for shares to facilitate exit by incumbent blockholders.   There may well be among 
the new shareholders one investor (or a close alliance of investors) that will want to obtain a 
dominant stake, whether because of private benefits of control or an intention to profit by 
setting the company’s strategic direction.  One powerful blockholder may thus simply be 
substituted for another.  If this occurs regularly, how does ownership separate from control?  
B. Key Theories 
In the early 1990s Mark Roe kicked off a lively debate about the determinants of 
ownership and control in large firms.  He did so with a theory that largely took for granted 
the first two of the core questions that need to be addressed to ascertain why ownership 
separates from control, implicitly assuming founders and their successors had good reasons to 
exit and that it was sensible for investors to buy shares in public companies.  What he sought 
to explain was why major financial intermediaries such as banks, insurance companies, 
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mutual funds and pension funds that had the wherewithal to buy enough shares in public 
companies to accumulate dominant positions failed to follow through.100   
Roe suggested that at several points in the 20th century powerful financial 
intermediaries were poised to accumulate substantial ownership blocks in American business 
firms but politicians, mindful of a deeply ingrained popular mistrust of concentrated financial 
power, derailed the process.101  Roe identified a series of legislative provisions that at various 
points in time discouraged financial intermediaries from taking up large ownership stakes in 
public companies.  Examples included rules precluding commercial banks from owning and 
dealing in securities, legislation discouraging insurance companies from investing in shares 
and regulations penalizing mutual funds and pension funds minded to accumulate big blocks 
of shares in a narrow range of companies.102   
Roe advanced subsequently an additional politically-oriented theory regarding 
ownership and control that implicitly focused on the second of the three core questions.  He 
hypothesized that public companies with widely dispersed share ownership are less likely to 
play a key role in “left-wing” social democracies than they are in “right-wing” countries.103  
His logic was that, with social democracies favoring employees over investors, those running 
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large firms in such jurisdictions cater to employee preferences and give shareholders short 
shrift.  Investors in turn steer clear of shares, thereby precluding the development of diffuse 
share ownership associated with the Berle-Means corporation.  According to Roe the United 
States never fit this pattern, with the class-based economic conflict that gives rise to social 
democracy failing ever to be sufficiently pronounced.  This had the effect of “keeping the 
pressures low that would make diffuse shareholders wary of leaving their money in 
managers’ hands.”104  
A hypothesis first advanced in the late 1990s to explain cross-border differences in 
stock market development105 addresses, at least in theoretical terms, all three core questions 
salient to a determination when ownership will separate from control in large firms.  This was 
what became known as the “law matters” thesis.106  With respect to ownership patterns, the 
thinking is that the extent to which corporate and securities law within a particular country 
protects minority shareholders does much to dictate whether large business enterprises will 
have diffuse or concentrated share ownership.107  This would become the most widely-cited 
and influential explanation for cross-country ownership and control patterns.108  
To grasp the logic underpinning the law matters thesis, assume a country has laws that 
regulate closely transactions between companies and their “insiders” (directors and key 
shareholders), preclude opportunistic conduct by those insiders and impose comprehensive 
disclosure requirements on companies that offer shares for sale to the public.  With such rules 
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in place, blockholders should lack scope to extract meaningful private benefits of control and 
thus may well be prepared to exit.  Concomitantly, investors, aware that the law 
circumscribes exploitation of outside shareholders and knowing disclosure regulation will 
help to address informational asymmetries that can afflict those who own equity in public 
companies, should feel “comfortable” buying stocks available for purchase.109  With few 
opportunities being available to take advantage of minority shareholders, those investors 
buying shares would be less inclined to forsake the benefits of diversification by 
accumulating dominant stakes in a single firm or a small portfolio of public corporations.  
Diffuse share ownership thus likely would become the norm in public companies.   
The law matters thesis appears to fit the facts well in the U.S.  It has a stock market-
oriented corporate economy (i.e. well-developed equity markets by global standards), diffuse 
share ownership has been sufficiently prevalent for large firms to be characterized as Berle-
Means corporations and it has a legal regime thought to offer substantial protection for 
investors.110  But did the configuration of corporate and securities law actually help to prompt 
the separation of ownership and control that occurred?  The law matters thesis implies that 
having legal rules in place that provide significant stockholder protection is a pre-condition 
for the blockholder exit and investor demand necessary for diffuse share ownership in large 
firms.111  Given that a separation of ownership and control became the standard arrangement 
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in large American public companies during the middle decades of the 20th century, it follows 
that the law should have been providing robust protection for shareholders beforehand.   
With respect to corporate law, which is state-based, there is a less than ideal fit with 
the law matters explanation for dispersed share ownership in large American firms.  
Delaware has been “the corporation homeland of America” at least as far back as 1930.112  
When the quantitative methodology used to measure corporate law for the purposes of testing 
the law matters thesis across countries is deployed historically it indicates that Delaware 
offered mediocre protection to shareholders throughout the first half the 20th century as well 
as subsequently.113  Moreover, according to Berle and Means, with the rights that corporate 
law did make available the expense and uncertainty associated with litigation left “the 
stockholder virtually helpless,” meaning “a stockholder’s right lies in the expectation of fair 
dealing rather than in the ability to enforce a series of supposed legal claims.”114 
On the other hand, federal reform occurring in the mid-1930s potentially lends 
credence to a law matters explanation of the separation of ownership and control in the U.S.  
As part of the “New Deal” Franklin Roosevelt launched shortly after becoming president in 
1933 a set of laws was introduced that plausibly would have prompted dominant shareholders 
to contemplate exit and made investors feel more “comfortable” about buying shares at prices 
sufficiently generous to make exit seem worthwhile.  The federal Securities Act of 1933 
required disclosure of material financial information about public offerings companies 
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made.115  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (S.E.C.), prohibited various forms of market manipulation and imposed 
substantial periodic disclosure requirements on publicly traded companies.116   
Tougher laws, in the form of federal securities regulation, plausibly did intensify the 
divorce between ownership and control in progress in larger American companies.  The 
federal securities laws enacted in the 1930s have been widely hailed as measures that restored 
investors’ faith in stocks after the harrowing 1929 stock market crash.117  Moreover, the 
timing fits well with the separation of ownership and control chronology already sketched 
out, in that dominant shareholders exited with some regularity in the quarter-century 
following regulatory reform.118  Management professors Allen Kaufman and Lawrence 
Zacharias have indeed suggested “New Deal securities legislation in effect authorized federal 
officials to reinforce the shareholder’s ownership role under state laws and to reduce the risks 
of separating ownership from control.”119   
Views Adolf Berle offered in the early 1960s regarding federal securities legislation 
lend credence to a “law matters” explanation for dispersed share ownership in the American 
context.  In particular, he expressed support for the idea that federal reforms had contributed 
to an environment where investors could be confident about how public companies would be 
run.  He also suggested ideas set forth in The Modern Corporation and Private Property had 
helped to create momentum in favor of introduction of the relevant regulatory changes.  He 
dealt with these points in the 1962 law review article where he acknowledged that the 
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separation of ownership and control had progressed considerably in the 30 years since he and 
Means wrote: 
“I gladly concede that the dishonest conflict of interest between management and 
shareholder ownership -- that is, abuse by management of a position in which it can 
divert a part of the profit and income stream to itself -- has not been accentuated.  
Again, it seems to me, our work may have been partly responsible. By law and stock-
exchange regulation, management is now obliged to file and publish annual accounts 
of its trust, and quarterly interim reports of its progress.  It must make general 
disclosure of its operations (a recommendation made in The Modern Corporation).  In 
all respects the businessmen-managers now operate under the glare of perpetual 
publicity….While human nature probably has not changed much, community 
standards do develop, and they have.  These have been implemented by institutions 
tending to enforce them (including) the Securities and Exchange Commission….”120  
While a plausible case can be made that federal securities law contributed to the 
diffusion of share ownership in large American companies the evidence is not clear cut.  
There is also reason to doubt whether Berle or The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property contributed substantially to the introduction of federal securities regulation.  
Considering the latter point first, Berle was by no means alone in suggesting that his work 
with Means was influential.121  Forbes said in 1958 “(d)amning greedy management for its 
frequent disdain of stockholders’ interests, Berle was author in fact and spirit of much New 
Deal legislation controlling corporate insiders.”122  The New York Times review of the 1968 
reissue of The Modern Corporation and Private Property said “(p)ublic regulation of the 
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stock exchanges is a large monument to any book.”123  Richard Posner, having just moved 
from academia to the bench, wrote in a 1982 judgment “(t)he intellectual patrimony of the 
Securities Exchange Act (of 1934) includes Berle and Means’ influential book.”124 
The role The Modern Corporation and Private Property played in fostering the 
introduction of federal securities regulation in fact was rather modest.  It identified issues to 
which a regulatory response might well be thought appropriate.125  Nevertheless, the book did 
not set out a case in favor of the sort of statutory and administrative reforms the 1933 and 
1934 Acts encompassed.126   
Berle, for his part, was a member of a “brain trust” advising Roosevelt during the 
1932 presidential election campaign.127  Nevertheless, Berle played little role in the design of 
the federal securities laws that were enacted.128  Moreover, when the changes were made 
Berle was unenthusiastic, as he believed the steps being taken were not sufficiently 
fundamental and far-reaching.129  He said of the 1933 Act the year it was promulgated “this 
form of measure, while salutary, is not of supreme importance.”130  Berle noted the 
legislation “cuts off certain illegitimate uses” but said “it leaves unsolved the major 
questions” such as “the problem of who is entitled to the increment of value arising from 
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organization, or the increment of power arising from control.  Those problems are left to the 
future.”131   
As for the contribution federal securities reform made to the divorce between 
ownership and control that was consolidated between the 1932 publication of The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property and the decades immediately following World War II, if 
legislative change indeed was decisive federal intervention should have elicited a reasonably 
rapid boost to investor confidence.  Such a surge in faith in stocks would have created 
sufficiently robust demand for shares at prices generous enough to induce blockholder exit.  
In fact, stock markets in the U.S. were in the doldrums for at least two decades following 
federal intervention in securities markets.  The number of shareholders flat-lined, public 
offering activity was below historical norms and the number of companies traded on national 
stock exchanges stagnated.132  Even by the mid-1950s, with the stock market performing well 
and the number of shareholders steadily increasing, jitters remained as Congressional 
testimony by prominent economist John Kenneth Galbraith paralleling conditions with those 
in place in 1929 prompted a stock market swoon.133  The hiatus between reform and the full 
restoration of investor confidence suggests that even if the enactment of federal securities law 
contributed to the unwinding of large stock ownership stakes following the publication of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property there were additional causes.  Two variables not 
accounted for thus far stand out, these being regulation of utilities and merger activity.    
C. Additional Variables 
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The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA),134 a legislative measure 
designed to simplify the corporate structure of the utilities industry, substantially unwound 
over time control blocks in a sector where they were particularly prevalent.  During the 
opening decades of the 20th century it was uncommon for an American public company to 
have a dominant corporate shareholder in a pyramidal arrangement.135  The arrangement was 
standard, however, in the utility sector, with numerous publicly traded utility companies 
having another company – typically itself a utility company – as a dominant shareholder.  For 
instance, 14 of the 52 utility companies in Berle and Means’ sample of the 200 largest non-
financial companies had pyramidal ownership features, a considerably higher proportion than 
for other types of companies.136  Though legal challenges blunted the full force of PUHCA 
until the 1940s, by the early 1950s reorganizations occurring pursuant to the legislation meant 
the end of the road for the corporate pyramid in the one economic sector where it truly 
flourished.137 
Merger activity also likely helped to foster the separation of ownership and control 
occurring during the middle decades of the 20th century, at least from the late 1940s onwards.  
Depending on the financing method, mergers can elicit diffusion of share ownership among 
companies conducting acquisitions.138  If an acquiring company issues new voting shares to 
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carry out a share-for-share exchange with the target company’s shareholders, executing the 
merger will inevitably dilute to some degree a blockholder’s stake in the acquiring company.  
The result will be the same if the target company shareholders are paid in cash raised from a 
public offering of voting shares by the acquirer, assuming the dominant stockholder does not 
buy a percentage of the shares matching current holdings.   
Merger activity was negligible during the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s but 
increased during the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s. 139  This surge may well have 
helped to foster ownership dispersion.  A 1959 Business Week article on Adolf Berle and 
share ownership entitled “Where Managers Get Their Power” illustrates contemporary 
awareness of the impact mergers could have on ownership structure.140  The article traced the 
history of a hypothetical firm launched in the late 19th century that made metal animal traps.  
The hypothetical company went public in the early 1940s as American Metalworking to raise 
capital to meet wartime demand.  Descendants of the founders still had a controlling interest.  
As the 1950s drew to a close the company was a diversified enterprise known as American 
Products Inc. with 100,000 shareholders and no individual owning more than 1 percent of the 
stock.  What happened?  For the hypothetical firm “(p)ostwar growth was a whoosh”, with 
the firm carrying out a dozen acquisitions financed partly by profits but also by a series of 
public offerings of securities that presumably greatly diluted the stake held by the founders’ 
descendants.  To the extent that the American Metalworking hypothetical captured reality for 
U.S. companies, merger activity would have contributed to the rise of the Berle-Means 
corporation.   
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V. THE FALL OF THE BERLE-MEANS CORPORATION? 
Having gone backwards in time to account for the rise of the Berle-Means corporation 
we now switch to the present day to consider its possible demise.  We will consider initially 
claims advanced that the Berle-Means corporation will soon be displaced as a symbol of 
corporate America, if it has not been displaced already.  We will then find out that if the fate 
of the Berle-Means corporation has been sealed, this is not because it has become the norm 
for public companies to have a single shareholder or a tight coalition of shareholders owning 
a dominant stake.  Instead institutional investors, considered on a collective basis, are 
ostensibly pivotal.  Parts VI and VII canvass the position with institutional shareholders.   
A. The Berle-Means Corporation Under Threat? 
While the Berle-Means corporation did not move fully into the ascendancy until the 
1950s, it appeared to be a durable construct once pre-eminence was achieved.  Mark Roe 
only developed the nomenclature in the early 1990s,141 assuming in so doing that it remained 
relevant at that point.  For instance, in his 1994 book Strong Managers, Weak Owners he 
connected Berle and Means with the present day, saying their “classic analysis….announced 
what came to be the dominant paradigm” and that “Berle and Means ‘discovered’ the modern 
corporation.”142   
Others subsequently affirmed the ongoing relevance of Berle and Means’ 
characterization of the American public company.  Economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, in a 1999 article that provided 
empirical evidence on cross-border ownership patterns indicating that the U.S. was out-of-
step with much of the rest of the world because blockholders were a rarity, said of the U.S. 
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that “(t)he Berle and Means image has clearly stuck” even if it had “begun to show some 
wear” because there were various empirical studies showing “a modest concentration of 
ownership.”143  Law professor Arthur Pinto, in a 2010 synopsis of corporate governance in 
the United States, remarked upon “(t)he predominance of the Berle-Means Corporation.”144   
While the Berle-Means corporation had a good run after its ascendance, speculation 
has been rife that its era will end soon, if it has not ended already.  Management professor 
Gerald Davis argued in a Berle symposium article published in 2011 that “(i)n another 
generation, the Berle and Means corporation may be just a memory.”145  Ronald Gilson and 
Jeff Gordon claimed two years later “(t)he Berle-Means description of the distribution of U.S. 
equity ownership simply is no longer correct.”146  Fellow legal academics Lucian Bebchuk, 
Alma Cohen and Scott Hirst asserted in 2017 that “the scenario of dispersed ownership 
described by Berle and Means (1932) no longer approximates reality, not even for the largest 
publicly traded corporations” and suggested “current share ownership is significantly more 
concentrated than the level described by Berle and Means (1932).”147   
B. The Return of Controlled Corporations? 
The funeral rites that have been read to the Berle-Means corporation should not be 
accepted at face value.  It moved to the forefront of the American corporate economy when 
shareholders with sufficiently large ownership stakes to dictate outcomes when stockholders 
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voted became the exception to the rule in large companies.148  Mark Roe has said “a 
shareholder with 25 percent of the company’s stock could veto empire-building acquisitions, 
question managerial performance, and in extreme instances, replace the managers.”149  One 
might logically expect that the Berle-Means corporation’s supposed demise is due to a revival 
of shareholders of this sort.  Despite speculation that shareholders with dominant stakes are 
becoming more prevalent in American public companies,150 there has been no such trend.  A 
2016 study of ownership patterns in the S&P 1500 stock market index carried out on behalf 
of the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCI) and Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) makes this clear.151   
The IRRCI/ISS study focused on “controlled companies”, with corporations 
qualifying in one of two circumstances.  The first was where a significant shareholder, or 
cohesive shareholder group, owned 30 percent or more of the voting shares.  The second was 
where there was a multi-class capital structure in place that allocated de facto control through 
share classes providing disproportionately large voting rights or enhanced board election 
rights.152  The IRRCI/ISS study found “(c)ontrary to common belief the number of controlled 
companies has declined recently”, with only 105, or 7 percent, of firms in the S&P 1500 
qualifying.153  As per the Berle-Means corporation characterization, then, stockholders with 
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sufficient voting clout to dictate outcomes in most circumstances are very much the exception 
to the rule in sizeable American public firms.154 
The small number of controlled companies needs to be borne in mind when 
considering Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst’s claim that ownership and control is currently more 
concentrated than it was in 1932.  When they drew upon Berle and Means’ data to compare 
1932 with the present day they excluded from their calculations corporations which had a 
shareholder or tight coalition of shareholders with dominant voting power. 155  While such 
companies are a rarity among larger public companies today, they made up a majority of the 
200 companies Berle and Means considered.156  Comparing all large companies rather than 
just those lacking a major shareholder would in all likelihood reveal ownership is 
considerably more widely dispersed today than it was in 1932.   
Among the 105 companies in the IRRCI/ISS study with controlling shareholders, 
there were 27 firms with a shareholder or shareholder group owning 30 percent or more of 
the shares and 78 with multi-class capital structures.  The growing popularity of multi-class 
shares among tech-oriented companies going public has been widely reported, with 
prominent examples including Mark Zuckerberg with Facebook in 2012 and Fitbit Inc. and 
Box Inc. in 2015.157  However, only a small minority of companies that join the stock market 
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have such arrangements in place.158  Indeed, the IRRCI/ISS study indicated the number of 
S&P 1500 companies where control existed due to a multi-class capital structure actually 
declined slightly from 79 in 2012. 159   
The IRRCI/ISS study did not take into account an increase in 2017 and 2018 of the 
number of venture-capital backed tech IPOs that provided for multi-class capital structures, 
exemplified by Snap becoming the first major company since at least 2000 to go public while 
offering shares with no voting rights attached.160  Nevertheless, such arrangements are 
unlikely to displace single-handed the Berle-Means corporation in the foreseeable future.  
Multi-class capital structures are too rare and too controversial – S&P Dow Jones announced 
in 2017 that it would no longer add companies with multi-class shares to its iconic S&P 500 
index161 -- for this to happen.  
VI. THE QUALIFIED RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS 
We now know the Berle-Means corporation’s days are not numbered because of the 
prevalence of shareholders with sufficient voting clout to dictate outcomes with shareholder 
votes, whether due to major ownership blocs or multi-class capital structures.  What threat is 
there, then?  Institutional intermediaries who collectively own large stakes in public 
companies are said to be responsible.  As Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst maintain, “the trend 
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toward dispersion has been reversed in subsequent decades by the rise of institutional 
investors.”162   
Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst’s institutional shareholder related critique of the Berle and 
Means characterization of ownership and control is oriented around the present day.  
Nevertheless, their reference to “subsequent decades” implies that the death knell for the 
Berle-Means corporation perhaps is not merely being sounded now.  Its fate may instead have 
been sealed for a considerable period of time.  That sort of chronology is at odds with the 
deployment of the Berle-Means corporation shorthand.  Mark Roe coined the term less than 
thirty years ago and it has been used with some regularity since then.163  To clarify matters, it 
is helpful to consider the history surrounding the rise of institutional shareholders in U.S. 
public companies.  We do this here and turn to present day circumstances in Part VII.   
Adolf Berle, in his 1959 book Power Without Property, said of investors in public 
companies “these stockholders, though politely still called ‘owners’, are passive.”164  Others 
agreed with this pessimistic verdict.  Shareholders were described in the 1950s and 1960s as 
“an apathetic bunch”165 that played “no active role at all.”166   
It was hardly surprising meaningful shareholder involvement in public company 
affairs was a rarity during the 1950s and 1960s.  “Household” investors – primarily 
individuals buying and selling securities for their own personal account-- collectively owned 
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most of the shares in publicly traded companies (Figure 1).167  Such private (“retail”) 
investors, caustically labelled in 1967 “20 Million Careless Capitalists,”168 typically lack the 
aptitude, resources and firm-specific information needed to intervene productively in 
corporate affairs.169  They have little incentive to step forward in any case, given the hassle 
involved and given that the typical private investor owns a tiny stake and thus will only 
benefit trivially in comparison to shareholders generally from any share price increase 
associated with a successful intervention.170 
Figure 1:  U.S. Corporate Stock Held by Households and Institutions, 1945-1995 
 
Source:  O’Sullivan (2000), OECD (1996)171 
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While retail investors dominated share ownership throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
institutional investors were growing in importance (Figure 1).  There were suggestions then 
that with institutional ownership increasing a promising source of managerial discipline was 
emerging.  John Kenneth Galbraith, in a review of Adolf Berle’s 1959 Power Without 
Property, identified the accumulation of shares by institutional investors as “the one looming 
threat to the autonomy of the professional managers.”172  The Christian Science Monitor 
maintained in 1966 that “(t)he growing share of institutional shareholders in stock ownership 
has raised the possibility of making corporate democracy more real.”173   
The institutional shareholders of the 1950s and 1960s, setting a pattern that would 
prevail over the next few decades, failed to step forward in the manner that seemed possible.  
Berle said in Power Without Property there was “ample evidence” institutional shareholders 
“do not wish to use the voting power of the stock they have accumulated” and indicated 
“(w)hen they seriously dislike the managements of corporations….their policy is to sell.”174  
Non-intervention in turn served “to insulate the corporate managements.”175  A 1965 study of 
institutional shareholders concurred with Berle, characterizing them as “silent partners” and 
indicating “(f)or the most part, institutions are investors not controllers.”176 
The high hopes dashed pattern was repeated in the 1970s.  Corporate law scholar 
Melvin Eisenberg, in his 1976 book The Structure of the Corporation, contrasted 
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“concentrated institutional shareholders” with “highly dispersed individual shareholdings,” 
saying only the former gave “some hope of a check – a countervailing force – to 
management.”177  Similarly, S.E.C. chairman Harold Williams said as the 1970s drew to a 
close that while “individual shareholder participation is not particularly effective,” 
“institutional shareholders have a part in vitalizing accountability.”178   
Institutional shareholders in fact were not much of a “countervailing force” during the 
1970s.  Edward McSweeney, a management consultant, observed in 1978 that “(s)o far, the 
managers of institutional funds have declined to interfere with management…preferring, like 
the ordinary stockholder, to sell when management fails to produce satisfactory earnings.”179  
A 1979 Conference Board study of equity markets that drew heavily on a survey of senior 
executives confirmed the point, saying “(n)o study respondent expressed the view that 
institutions try to influence management.”180 
Expectations regarding the contribution institutional shareholders could and would 
make in keeping public company executives in check stepped up a gear in the early 1990s.  
Share ownership patterns were part of the reason, with the proportion of shares retail 
investors owned having fallen to barely half (Figure 1).  Also, hostile takeovers, which kept 
management on its toes during 1980s amidst hectic deal-making, receded into the corporate 
governance background as the 1990s got underway.181  Institutional shareholders were 
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identified as logical candidates to fill the governance gap.182  Furthermore, reforms were 
being undertaken to facilitate shareholder intervention.  In 1992 the S.E.C. amended its rules 
governing parties who solicit proxies (lobby to vote on behalf of stockholders not voting in 
person at shareholder meetings) to give institutional shareholders scope to discuss privately 
investee companies without having to comply with potentially onerous proxy solicitation 
regulations, such as a requirement to file relevant documentation to obtain advance clearance 
by the Commission.183   
The rise of institutional investors was hailed regularly during the 1990s as a major 
corporate governance phenomenon.  In 1994, Forbes published a story entitled “Good-bye to 
Berle & Means” that cited a handful of instances where institutional pressure contributed to 
the dismissal of chief executive officers (CEOs) of a number of prominent public companies 
to make the point “shareholders and boards of directors showed the boss who was boss.”184  
Management professor Michael Useem suggested in 1996 “(i)nstitutional investors are the 
new high priests, the new repositories of wealth and power.”185  Richard Koppes, recently 
departed general counsel and number two executive at the California Public Employees 
Retirement System, a powerful public sector employee oriented (“public”) pension fund, 
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argued in 1997 that “(n)othing has defined the revolution of corporate governance over the 
last 20 years as the rise of institutional investors.”186   
Yet again, though, institutional shareholders flattered to deceive.  The Financial 
Times observed in 1995 “(u)ntil now, shareholder activism in the U.S. has been a tepid 
affair.”187  Law professor Bernard Black, who had been optimistic about the potential for 
shareholder activism during the early 1990s,188 indicated in a 1998 survey of the topic “(t)he 
overall level of shareholder activism is quite low” and pointed out that “(e)ven the most 
active institutions spend less than half a basis point of assets (0.005%) under management on 
their governance efforts.”189  Economists Franklin Edwards and Glenn Hubbard, arguing in 
2000 that institutional stock ownership was “a promise unfulfilled”, noted that “institutional 
investors on the whole have not taken an active role in corporate governance.”190   
The proportion of shares owned by households (i.e. retail investors) fell to 46% in 
2000 and again to 36% in 2008.191  Moreover, the proportion of public companies which had 
at least one institutional shareholder owning 10% or more of the shares had increased to 30% 
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by 2008 from 12% in 1980 and 20% in 1995.192  The bias in favor of passivity nevertheless 
continued in the 2000s.   
A 2005 analysis of corporate governance arrangements in Germany, Japan, France, 
Britain and the United States said of the U.S. “(a)part from…public…pension funds…there 
are few signs of shareholder activism”  193  Law professor Steve Bainbridge observed 
similarly in 2010, “(t)oday, institutional investor activism remains rare.  It is principally the 
province of union and state and local public employee pension funds.  But while these 
investors’ activities generate considerable press attention, they can hardly be said to have 
reunited ownership and control.”194  A key practical obstacle to a more robust approach to 
shareholder activism was that the investment managers with scope to interact with public 
company executives were typically seeking to maximize risk-adjusted investment returns so 
as to prevail in an ongoing competition to attract and retain mandates to manage funds.195  
With improved returns in a particular company most often having no more than a marginal 
impact on a diversified investment portfolio, with activism being time-consuming, costly and 
not always successful, and with only a small fraction of any gains generated accruing to an 
enterprising investor who happened to step forward, the sums simply did not add up.196 
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What did all of this signify for the Berle-Means corporation?  For some observers, the 
dramatic growth in institutional shareholdings since the mid-20th century meant that the Berle 
and Means characterization of the corporate economy was intrinsically outmoded.  For 
instance, in 1993 Fortune drew attention to Berle and Means’ work, proclaimed “(t)hat era 
has ended” and quoted in support of that proposition the trustee of four New York City 
pension funds, who said of institutional investors “(w)e own the American economy now.”197  
Law professor Robert Hamilton, referring to the growth of institutional shareholdings in a 
2000 article on corporate governance, said likewise “(o)bviously, with such concentrations of 
voting power, the Berle and Means model of the publicly held corporation is no longer 
valid.”198 
The obsolescence of the Berle-Means corporation in fact was not as self-evident as 
Fortune and Hamilton suggested.  The nomenclature Roe coined as the 1990s got underway 
was gaining traction just as the growth of institutional shareholders was supposedly rendering 
it passé.  This was not inherently anomalous; the strong bias in favor of passivity on the part 
of most institutional shareholders likely meant that public company executives retained 
substantial discretion despite the shift toward institutional ownership.  Indeed, the autonomy 
of top management was expansive enough to mean that by the end of the 1990s chief 
executives in large public firms were operating with sufficient swagger to be characterized as 
“imperial” CEOs.199  In 1991 law professor Jack Coffee, having acknowledged “the 
Berle/Means public corporation” was “the dominant American organizational form”, 
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elaborated on why it remained pre-eminent despite the substantial growth in institutional 
shareholdings:   
“Yet if one looks only at the size of institutional holdings, one may commit the 
classic mistake of confusing an ox for a bull.  Although public pension funds are 
"bulls" who often engage in aggressive, outspoken criticism of corporate 
management, they constitute only a modest minority of institutional investors. Most 
other institutional investors seem closer to ‘oxen,’ because they have shown little 
willingness to oppose corporate managements or even to support dissidents.”200 
Drawing matters together, with respect to the interplay between the substantial growth 
of institutional shareholdings and the continued use of the Berle-Means corporation 
nomenclature, by the early 2000s a division of opinion had emerged.  Some – such as 
Fortune and Robert Hamilton -- felt that the large-scale substitution of “careless capitalists” 
(i.e. retail investors) with institutional shareholders was sufficient to render the Berle-Means 
characterization of American corporate governance per se obsolete.  With the Berle-Means 
corporation nomenclature gaining favor, however, the prevailing view was that the bias in 
favor of passivity affecting institutional shareholders meant ownership remained separate 
from control despite the growth in institutional holdings.  We will consider next whether the 
position with institutional investors has changed sufficiently in recent years to displace this 
prevailing view, and will see that this has not occurred.  We will also find out that the 
emergence of a fresh source of shareholder pressure on management, activist hedge funds, 
has not eclipsed the Berle-Means corporation yet and is unlikely to do so for the foreseeable 
future.   
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VII. THE BERLE-MEANS CORPORATION TODAY – AND TOMORROW  
We have just seen that various observers were saying “Good-bye to Berle & Means” 
during the 1990s but the Berle-Means corporation survived as a popular moniker for the 
American public company even if the nomenclature had begun “to show some wear.”201  
Switching to the present day, a common refrain is that the Berle and Means characterization 
of ownership and control in U.S. public companies is “now wrong”?202  What might have 
changed in the meantime to seal the fate of the Berle-Means corporation?  One possibility, a 
now supposedly dominant collective stake of the largest institutional shareholders, has 
already been identified briefly.203  Other candidates are the emergence of activism by hedge 
funds and the growing prominence of index tracking funds.  We will consider each in turn.  
None in fact are major difference makers with respect to the inter-relationship between 
ownership, control and managerial discretion, meaning the Berle-Means corporation 
nomenclature remains apt.   
A. Concentrated Institutional Ownership 
One point those who have recently been hailing the demise of the Berle-Means 
corporation make is that the collective stake of the largest institutional shareholders has now 
become so sizeable the concept’s fate must be sealed.  For instance, Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Hirst, having posited “the prospects for stewardship by shareholders are substantially better 
today than in Berle-Means corporations,” support their claim by citing share ownership data 
for 2016 for the 20 largest U.S. corporations lacking a controlling shareholder.204  They 
report that, on average, the five largest institutional shareholders owned 21 percent of the 
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shares, the largest 20 owned 33 percent and the largest 50 owned 44 percent.205  Gilson and 
Gordon concluded on the basis of similar data they collected for 2009 for the 10 biggest U.S. 
companies that “representatives of institutions that collectively represent effective control of 
many large U.S. corporations could fit around a boardroom table.”206 
Undertakers for the Berle-Means corporation appear to be assuming that collective 
institutional stakes of the sort currently prevailing in the largest U.S. public companies will 
translate readily into substantial compromising of managerial discretion.  This can by no 
means be taken for granted, as research on British institutional investors indicates.  In the 
mid-1990s, Bernard Black and Jack Coffee examined levels of institutional shareholder 
activism in the United Kingdom to gauge the prospects for activism in the United States, 
citing the fact that there were fewer barriers to intervention in Britain.207  One such 
consideration was the prevalence of sizeable institutional stakes.  According to Black and 
Coffee, it was typical for the 25 largest institutional shareholders to hold a majority of the 
stock of a U.K. public company,208 a higher ownership concentration than Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Hirst cite for large U.S. public companies today.  Nevertheless, a separation of ownership 
and control remained a hallmark of corporate Britain.  Black and Coffee acknowledged there 
was not “the complete passivity announced by Berle and Means” but emphasized “the 
reluctance of even large shareholders to intervene.”209 
The bias in favor of passivity that prevailed among powerful institutional shareholders 
in 1990s corporate Britain is paralleled today in the United States.  Gilson and Gordon 
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acknowledge that while theoretically the substantial collective stakes held by major 
institutional shareholders in U.S. public companies “should mitigate the managerial agency 
cost problems of the Berle-Means corporation….(r)eality has fallen short.” 210  Gilson and 
Gordon say of the possibility of U.S. institutional investors acting as “real” owners or 
“stewards”, “institutions have continually failed to play this role; despite the urging of 
academics and regulators, they remain stubbornly responsive but not proactive.”211   
Other observers concur.  John Bogle, founder of the giant mutual fund group 
Vanguard, cited in 2005 the potentially “awesome power” of institutional investors and 
referred to the largest institutional holders as “the King Kong of investment America.”212  He 
conceded in 2012 that “the strong voice I expected to hear is barely a whisper.”213  
Investment bankers Joseph Perella and Peter Weinberg wrote in the New York Times in 2014 
“the big shareholders, the institutional shareholders who invest for pension funds and the like, 
need to stop being silent and speak out.”214  The Economist said in 2015 of major American 
asset managers “their business is running diversified portfolios and they would rather sell 
their shares in a struggling firm than face the hassle of fixing it.”215 
                                                          
210  Gilson & Gordon, supra note 6, 889.   
211  Id. at 888.   
212  JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM xxi, 76 (2005).   
213  JOHN C. BOGLE, THE CLASH OF CULTURES:  INVESTMENT VS. SPECULATION 66-67 
(2012). 
214  Joseph Perella & Peter Weinberg, Powerful, Disruptive Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 9, 2014, A23.   
215  An Investor Calls, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2015, 19.  McCahery, Sautner and Starks 
report on the basis of responses to questionnaires sent in 2012 and 2013 to representatives of 
institutional shareholders “widespread use of behind-the-scenes engagement” – Joseph A. 
McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2908 (2016).  Given that 
the survey response rate was only 4.3 percent and that only 24 percent of the institutional 
shareholders were based in the U.S. (see at 2908, 2910) the extent to which this conclusion 
can appropriately be generalized in the American context is impossible to gauge.   
54 
 
 
 
The bias against activism amongst institutional investors is evidenced by the fact that 
even the largest asset managers acting on behalf of mutual funds and pension funds have for 
the hundreds of corporations in which they invest only a small department dedicated to 
shareholder voting and other governance-related stewardship activities.216  Modest staffing 
reflects, as the Financial Times said of the situation in the U.S. in 2015, “the Cinderella status 
of governance within fund management businesses.  While trumpeted as important, it is not 
an area on which institutions have historically lavished pay and investment.”217  With a small 
governance contingent in place it is feasible for major asset managers to make reasoned 
decisions whether to back firm-specific proposals activist shareholders periodically make and 
to adopt a voting stance opposing generic management-friendly governance mechanisms such 
as “staggered” boards where only a designated proportion of directors stand for election each 
year and “plurality” voting where an unopposed board nominee need not obtain a majority of 
votes cast to be elected.218  Shareholders, however, almost never exercise rights they might 
have to veto transactions executives propose.219  More generally, taking a sufficiently close 
interest in a particular company to offer detailed guidance on strategy or spearhead a public 
activism campaign will be off the agenda.220    
Mutual funds and pension funds do pretty much always vote their shares, due in large 
part to a strong steer to do so from the S.E.C. and Department of Labor rules.221  The level of 
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engagement with the issues, however, is decidedly modest.  To manage the costs associated 
with the potentially daunting number of resolutions on which public companies ask their 
shareholders to vote – 250,000 per year by one count -- asset managers rely heavily on advice 
they pay to receive from proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass 
Lewis.222  Jamie Dimon, CEO of megabank JPMorgan Chase, has accused investment 
managers of being “lazy capitalists” due to the farming out of voting decisions to these 
advisory services.223  The extent to which fund managers adopt proxy adviser 
recommendations differs depending on the circumstances but departures from what is 
prescribed are uncommon.224  Justin Fox, a financial journalist and Jay Lorsch, a Harvard 
Business School expert on corporate governance, have said of the result “(i)t’s better than 
nothing, which is what most individual investors do, but it’s a standardized and usually 
superficial sort of oversight.”225  
If, despite substantial collective holdings, large institutional shareholders are not 
compromising markedly managerial autonomy, why might it be that, as Gilson and Gordon 
and Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst posit, that the Berle-Means corporation is passé?  According 
to Gilson and Gordon, what has emerged is a regime of “agency capitalism” where 
institutional shareholders, as agents for end investors, are “not ‘rationally apathetic’…but 
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instead are ‘rationally reticent’.”226  With respect to the discretion available to executives 
running public companies, this could well be a distinction without a difference.  Unless 
institutional shareholders begin conducting themselves in the manner that would be expected 
of “real” owners, the managerial accountability challenges that characterize the Berle-Means 
corporation will remain live issues despite substantial and quite concentrated institutional 
ownership.  Correspondingly, absent concrete evidence of shareholders regularly taking 
meaningful steps to keep management in check, the term “Berle-Means corporation” remains 
appropriate short-hand for the paradigmatic American public company.  We will consider 
next whether hedge funds that specialize in shareholder activism might be changing the 
game.   
B. Hedge Fund Activism 
We have just seen that, from the rise of the Berle-Means corporation through to the 
present day, “mainstream” institutional investors have forsaken stepping forward in the 
manner those optimistic about institutional shareholder involvement in corporate governance 
have envisaged.  In the 2000s, however, a sub-set of hedge funds – lightly regulated 
collective investment vehicles marketed to sophisticated investors -- began launching with 
some frequency campaigns to pressure public company executives to engage in shareholder-
friendly change.227  The typical tactic was to build up quietly a sizeable but by no means 
dominant holding in a suitable target and then agitate for change, with common demands 
being that management return cash to shareholders by way of a stock buyback or a one-off 
dividend payment, sell weak divisions to improve the bottom line and even put the company 
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itself up for sale.228  Hedge fund interventions were sufficiently prominent to be characterized 
as “the newest big thing in corporate governance” in the 2000s.229  
The turmoil associated with the 2008 financial crisis posed challenges for hedge fund 
activists but activism continued, albeit without quite the same intensity as during the mid-
2000s.230  Hedge fund activism then went into overdrive as the 2010s got underway.  Jack 
Coffee and financial economist Darius Palia said in 2016 hedge fund interventions had 
“recently spiked, almost hyperbolically.”231   
The efforts of hedge funds play an important part in Ronald Gilson and Jeff Gordon’s 
claim that the Berle-Means corporation has been relegated to a historical curiosity.  Having 
acknowledged that mainstream institutional shareholders fail to act like “real owners” despite 
substantial collective ownership, they hail hedge fund activists as “governance 
intermediaries” who identify underperforming firms and put forward concrete proposals for 
changes intended to improve shareholder returns.232  As Gilson and Gordon point out, 
mainstream institutional investors are often favorably disposed toward such initiatives and 
institutional backing in its turn frequently represents sufficient voting power to swing around 
otherwise recalcitrant executives of targeted companies.233  This “happy complementarity” 
generates, according to Gilson and Gordon, effective shareholder-related governance 
unknown to the Berle-Means corporation.234   
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Gilson and Gordon likely over-estimate the transformative effect of activist hedge 
funds on shareholder/management relations.  For instance, hedge fund interventions are 
something of a rarity in the case of big public companies.  With very large prospective targets 
typically too many eggs have to be put in one investment basket for it to be worthwhile for a 
hedge fund to buy up the sort of sizeable minority stake likely required to capture 
management’s attention and needed to yield meaningful profits in the event of success.235   
The New York Post did warn in 2013 that “no company is safe as corporate cage 
rattlers take aim at some of the biggest names in business.”236  The Economist provided 
readers with examples in 2015, saying “Americans encounter firms that activists have 
targeted when they brush their teeth (Procter & Gamble), answer their phone (Apple), log in 
to their computer (Microsoft, Yahoo and eBay), dine out (Burger King and PepsiCo) and 
watch television (Netflix).”237  Such interventions are, however, aberrations.  According to 
FactSet, a financial data company, in 2016 among 319 “high intensity” activist interventions 
(those where a shareholder activist sought to obtain board representation, dismiss top 
executives or otherwise campaign strongly to bolster shareholder value) affecting U.S. public 
companies, only 5 percent involved a target with a market capitalization exceeding $10 
billion.238  $10 billion may sound like a large number, but as of mid-2018, among the largest 
100 companies in the S&P 500 stock market index, the market capitalization of the smallest 
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was $32.1 billion.239  Correspondingly, while activist hedge funds are significant corporate 
governance intermediaries, their activities are insufficient in isolation to displace with any 
sort of regularity the reticence (or apathy) among shareholders that would be expected in a 
large public company. 
Hedge fund activism may also have reached an inflection point marking the end of the 
upward trajectory that began in the 2000s.240  Public company executives, realizing they can 
end up on the back foot once a hedge fund activist arrives, are increasingly taking advance 
precautions.  Reputedly, “‘think like an activist’ has become a boardroom mantra as 
companies strive to anticipate potential hedge fund demands and address perceived 
weaknesses.”241  Numerous companies have, for instance, begun engaging in activist “fire 
drills”, identifying areas of vulnerability and making changes so as to try to forestall a hedge 
fund foray.242  With public companies reading the activism playbook and taking anticipatory 
measures, hedge funds seem to be pulling back as they realize there are fewer instances 
where intervening will add value.243  The number of activist forays indeed declined 
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substantially in 2016 and 2017 as compared to 2014 and 2015, including among large public 
companies.244   
Data for the first few months of 2018 suggest the decline in hedge fund interventions 
may have ended, at least temporarily.245  Another trend, however, should, if it persists, 
preclude a meaningful enduring surge in hedge fund activism.  Activist hedge funds have, on 
average, been generating poor returns lately.246  Perhaps with public company executives 
endeavoring to think like activists there are now few instances where underperformance is 
sufficiently egregious for intervention to yield bumper returns.  Whatever the explanation, 
investors, disappointed with results activist hedge funds have been delivering, have begun 
taking their money out of the sector, a trend that inevitably would throw the brakes on activist 
hedge fund growth if it continues in earnest.247  Hedge fund activism thus appears to be 
stalling, even if there is no full-scale retreat on the horizon.  This means, in turn, that if hedge 
fund activists have not already dealt the fatal blow to the Berle-Means corporation they are 
unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.     
C. Index Trackers 
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Whatever the position turns out to be with hedge funds, with mainstream institutional 
shareholders there is a recent twist in the plot of which account must be taken.  Dramatic 
growth in the popularity of “passive” index tracking funds has resulted in fears of “a 
concentration of ownership not seen since the days of the Rockefeller Trust” oriented around 
Standard Oil at the turn of the 20th century.248  Perhaps this “re-concentration of corporate 
ownership” is “a fundamental reorganization of the system of corporate governance”249 that 
could yet spell doom for the Berle-Means corporation. 
From an investor perspective, index tracking funds have much to recommend them.  
Big tracker funds drive down fees by exploiting economies of scale and by deploying a plain 
vanilla investment approach, namely matching the performance of a stock market index such 
as the S&P 500.250  For instance, the expense ratio for the main S&P tracker fund which the 
Vanguard Group operates is 0.04 percent of the fund’s assets, as compared with 0.8 percent 
for the average actively managed American mutual fund.251  If actively managed funds 
outperformed the market, the higher fees would be good value.  They usually do not, 
however.  Passive funds typically deliver superior returns over time, even discounting the fee 
advantage a plain vanilla tracking strategy provides.252 
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Investors have increasingly been swung around by the logic of index tracking funds.  
In 2016, of the more than $400 billion of new retail investments coming through financial 
advisers, 82 percent was placed in index funds and their close relative, exchange trading 
funds.253  With the money pouring in, the proportion of the S&P 500 owned by U.S.-based 
index trackers increased from 4.6 percent in 2005 to 13.9 percent in 2017.254 
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, the three largest U.S.-based asset 
management firms, dominate the rapidly growing index tracking industry.255  With a 
substantial majority of equity assets under management of each of “the Big Three” invested 
in passive index funds,256 the dramatic growth of index tracking funds has meant their stakes 
in public companies have increased substantially recently.  Vanguard’s passive funds alone 
held a stake of 5 percent or more in 468 S&P 500 companies as of 2016, up from just three in 
2005.257  The proportion of S&P 500 companies where BlackRock, Vanguard, and State 
Street combined would constitute the largest shareholder increased from 25 percent in 2000 
to 88 percent in 2015.258   
The large collective stake the Big Three hold in U.S. public companies has been 
referred to as “(a)n economic blockbuster” that “has recently been exposed.”259  In particular, 
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the anti-competitive effects of “common ownership”, which exists where a single investor 
owns shares of competing firms, have set off alarm bells.260  An investor in this position will 
potentially prefer that the co-owned corporations refrain from competing intensely so as to 
create scope for charging higher prices that will bolster profits and shareholder returns.261  
With the Big Three having ostensibly emerged as “the dominant capital market players of our 
time”262 concerns exist that their collective common ownership is substantial enough to 
impact upon the behavior of market leaders in key industries and create substantial anti-
competitive effects throughout the U.S. economy.263 
Regardless of who the shareholders might be, executives running firms that dominate 
an industry with oligopolistic features have incentives to throw the competitive brakes on so 
as to avoid difficult decisions and enjoy a “quiet life”.264  The manner in which the Big Three 
operate indicates that they are unlikely to do much, if anything, to reinforce whatever 
tendencies already exist for rivals in an industry to ease off competitively.265  With respect to 
the governance of public companies any highly diversified investment fund will have a bias 
in favor of passivity.  Intervening may not yield a beneficial outcome, the benefits arising 
from successful interventions have to be shared amongst all shareholders and the expense and 
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distractions associated with stepping forward could result in losing out in terms of relative 
performance to less energetic, free-riding rivals.266  Index tracker funds have particularly 
weak incentives to act as engaged shareholders.267  Operators of index funds do not compete 
over the performance of the index they are set up to mimic, which is taken as a given, and 
instead focus on keeping costs as low as possible and eliminating tracking errors.268  
Correspondingly, if those running an index fund expend resources to identify and correct 
underperformance in particular companies, any gains will be shared with the market at large, 
fees will likely increase and, in an industry where price competition has a significant effect 
on investor inflows, market share could well be lost rapidly to cheaper, fully passive rivals.269   
Operators of index tracking funds insist they are not mere “professional snoozers.”270  
Larry Fink, BlackRock’s CEO, who reputedly wants “to be the conscience of Corporate 
America,”271 maintains “(t)he time has come for a new model of shareholder engagement— 
one that strengthens and deepens communication between shareholders and the companies 
that they own.”272  Similarly Vanguard Principal and Fund Controller Glenn Booraem has 
said its funds seek to be “passive investors but active owners.”273  Booraem reasons 
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Vanguard and other investment firms operating index tracking funds must exercise their 
voices because with the level of investment in companies being pre-determined by the market 
“(w)e’re riding in a car we can’t get out of” and “(g)overnance is the seat belt and air 
bag.’”274  Fear of criticism provides an additional incentive to speak up.  A State Street 
official has said “(w)e are stewards of a large part of the U.S. economy, and it’s important 
that we do that properly.  If we didn’t do that, we’d open ourselves up to opprobrium from 
our investors.”275 
The Big Three have added staff recently to deal with governance and stewardship.276  
Nevertheless, each of the firms is poorly situated to impinge substantially on the discretion of 
public company executives, whether to encourage those executives to throw the competitive 
brakes on or otherwise.  BlackRock’s governance team is comprised of around 35 employees 
tasked with overseeing the 14,000 companies in which BlackRock owns shares.277  Vanguard 
has just over 20 people for its 13,000 companies and State Street has approximately a dozen 
for its 9,000.278  The Big Three’s governance staffers carry out dozens of engagements each 
year with management of companies in which their index tracking funds own shares.279  
Nevertheless, with most portfolio companies it is not feasible to arrange a meeting even 
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annually.280  Public company executives notice.  A CEO told the Financial Times in 2017 
“(w)e’d love to talk to the passive guys, they control 20 per cent of our shares, but they don’t 
want to see us.”281 
Given the modest amount of direct contact between the Big Three indexers and public 
companies in which they own shares, anything approaching the sort of firm-specific 
meddling in which activist hedge funds engage is unrealistic.  BlackRock’s head of corporate 
governance has acknowledged “(i)t’s not the shareholders’ role to second guess what 
management is doing in every single issue.”282  The largest passive investors do throw their 
weight around sometimes.283  For instance, votes against board nominees companies put 
forward occur with some regularity.284  Critics nevertheless charge index trackers with failing 
to devote any more attention to the voting process than is required to satisfy regulators “or 
perhaps to satisfy their own conscience and boost their firm’s image.”285  Whatever their 
attentiveness level, most often leading passive investors back management.286  In 2017, 
BlackRock supported management’s stance 91 percent of the time, State Street did so with 86 
percent of resolutions and Vanguard’s support level was 94 percent.287  The Financial Times 
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has said of this pattern that it signals “a degree of inattention at odds with dynamic 
stewardship claims.”288  
Voting patterns on executive pay confirm the tendency among the largest passive 
investors to support management.  Under the Dodd Frank Act of 2010, a “say on pay” 
scheme was introduced giving shareholders of publicly traded companies the right to vote on 
executive pay policy on an advisory basis at least once every three years.289  When 
shareholders have the opportunity to vote they rarely oppose the approach being taken.  From 
2011 through 2017 with corporations in the Russell 3000 stock market index the company 
lost outright only 1.9 percent of time.290  In the case of S&P 500 companies shareholder 
support levels for management on say on pay resolutions were 91 percent in 2016 and 92 
percent in 2017.291  BlackRock and Vanguard have been particularly strong backers.  During 
2016 each voted 98 percent in favor of pay practices at S&P 500 companies.292  The New 
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York Times has said of BlackRock’s voting power on executive pay that its “big stick is more 
like a wet noodle.”293 
Executive pay has increased noticeably since say on pay’s introduction, with the 
median pay of S&P 500 CEOs rising from just under $9 million in 2010 to $11.6 million in 
2017.294  This trend, combined with strong shareholder support for policies upon which they 
have been asked to vote, has prompted harsh verdicts on the say on pay experiment such as 
“tinkering at the edges at best,”295 “a bust”,296 and “ineffective.”297  Say on pay has 
nevertheless not been a corporate governance irrelevance.298  As the Wall Street Journal 
noted in 2014, even though the votes are nonbinding “most corporate boards consider a 
negative vote a black eye and work hard to respond to shareholder concerns.”299  The say on 
pay process has correspondingly prompted many companies to increase board outreach to 
shareholders, accompanied by the opening of new lines of communication.300  Boards in their 
turn have been prepared to make modifications to head off dissent, which likely has bolstered 
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the high approval rates which have been obtained.301  The fact that executive pay is a key 
topic for discussion with nearly half of the engagements BlackRock has with public 
companies despite BlackRock rarely actually voting against management on executive pay 
lends credence to this conjecture.302  
The say on pay regime, where public companies listen to their shareholders but retain 
considerable scope to proceed in the manner they see fit, reflects broader trends concerning 
mainstream institutional investors.  Rav Gupta, a former CEO of a Fortune 500 chemical 
concern and an outside director of additional Fortune 500 companies, likely was correct 
when he suggested in 2016 that due primarily to large institutional intermediaries  
“shareholders are exerting a more effective and powerful influence on corporate management 
than in the past.”303  On the other hand, there remains a continued bias against engagement 
that means public company executives have wide discretion to run their firms without 
provoking active pushback.304  For instance, Jeffery Immelt managed to remain chief 
executive of American corporate icon General Electric for 16 years despite the corporation’s 
share price never being higher than it was in 2001, the year he was appointed.305  
Correspondingly, despite institutional shareholders owning a large proportion of shares in 
public companies and despite the collective stake of the biggest institutions being substantial, 
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there remains a separation of ownership and control in public firms not very far removed 
from the Berle and Means’ 1930s version.   
Assuming the popularity of index tracking funds continues to grow, the trend likely 
will reinforce the institutional bias against activism despite their collective ownership stake 
growing in size.  Only time will tell exactly what corporate governance role BlackRock, 
Vanguard and State Street will assume.306  Given the business model underpinning index 
tracking funds, however, it is unlikely that the voting power available to passive indexers will 
substantially compromise existing managerial prerogatives in the foreseeable future.  
Concrete, sustained evidence of shareholders taking meaningful, proactive steps to keep 
management in check would mean that it would no longer be appropriate to refer to the 
paradigmatic American public company as the Berle-Means corporation.  That evidence is 
currently lacking and, despite the attention index tracking funds have garnered, likely will be 
for some time yet. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously declared in 1932 that America’s largest 
corporations were characterized by a separation of ownership and control.  Their call on this 
was somewhat premature.  Even among the largest companies at the start of the 1930s only a 
minority lacked a shareholder that owned a sufficiently large stake to exercise meaningful 
influence.  Nevertheless, Berle and Means would set the tone for debates about public 
company governance for decades to come.    
Having documented that many public companies lacked large shareholders, including 
amongst the executive cohort, Berle and Means mused in The Modern Corporation and 
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Private Property “if all profits are earmarked for the security holder, where is the inducement 
for those in control to manage the enterprise efficiently?”307  They also asked their readers 
“have we any justification for assuming that those in control of a modern corporation will 
also choose to operate it in the interests of their owners?”308  It would soon become the norm 
for large U.S. corporations to lack stockholders with ownership stakes sufficiently substantial 
to create the incentive to monitor executives closely and to provide the voting clout needed to 
exercise meaningful influence.  Given, as Berle and Means indicated, the potential for abuse 
of managerial discretion where share ownership is diffuse, the separation of ownership and 
control was destined to become what Mark Roe described in 2005 as “the core fissure” in 
American corporate governance.309   
The “Berle-Means corporation”, the term Roe coined in the early 1990s as shorthand 
for the large public company where ownership is divorced from control, was the locale for 
the core governance fissure he identified.  Ironically, at the time Roe developed the Berle-
Means corporation nomenclature, its position at the center of the American corporate 
governance firmament was under threat in a manner unprecedented since a separation of 
ownership and control became the norm in large U.S. firms in the 1940s and 1950s.  The 
1990s was a period when institutional investors became sufficiently prevalent as stockholders 
to prompt suggestions share ownership in public companies had coalesced in a way that made 
the Berle-Means characterization of the large firm passé.  In addition, a prevailing 
assumption that a separation of ownership and control in big companies was the product of 
basic business logic was displaced.  Roe, by arguing in the early 1990s that the dominance of 
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the Berle-Means corporation was at least partly a product of political context, began to upend 
the received wisdom and launched a still continuing debate on determinants of ownership 
structure in large firms.   
We have now moved on nearly 30 years since the Berle-Means corporation entered 
the corporate governance lexicon and since challenges to its conceptual dominance began 
occurring in earnest.  Doubts continue to be cast on the appropriateness of invoking Berle and 
Means to characterize ownership and control arrangements in larger American public 
companies.  This is not because shareholders with sufficiently large ownership stakes to be 
both inclined and capable of exercising dominant influence over management have moved (or 
more accurately returned) to the forefront in large American public companies.  Instead, 
hedge fund activism and collective institutional stakes sufficiently large to mean that 
investment intermediaries representing close to a majority of outstanding shares could sit 
around a boardroom table are ostensibly prompting the Berle-Means corporation’s demise.   
It in fact is premature to write the obituary for the Berle-Means corporation.  Hedge 
funds are significant corporate governance intermediaries but challenges to large firms 
remain rare and hedge fund activism may well have peaked after a lengthy surge.  As for 
“mainstream” institutional shareholders, departures from the hands-off approach to 
governance associated with the Berle-Means corporation have been modest overall, with 
these investors showing little inclination to engage in meaningful stockholder-oriented 
stewardship.  With index-tracking funds, given their business model, continued growth in 
their ownership stake seems likely to fortify the institutional investor bias in favor of 
passivity rather than hasten the arrival of “real” owners in large American public companies.  
The upshot is that, despite the wear and tear the Berle-Means corporation has suffered in 
recent decades, it has yet to fall by the wayside and seems unlikely to do so for the 
foreseeable future.      
